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Northwestern University
In the 1960s, the U.S. economy was flying high. Between 1961 and 
1969, we experienced the longest and strongest economic expansion in 
U.S. history. The economy grew by an average of 4.3 percent per year, 
while unemployment was at 3.5 percent by the end of the decade. At 
the same time, the share of the population below the poverty line fell 9 
percentage points, from 22 percent in 1960 to 13 percent by 1970.' 
Most economic analyses indicate that it was the booming economic 
growth that reduced poverty in the 1960s.
Now fast-forward to the 1980s. After two back-to-back recessions 
during 1980 and 1982, there was a strong and rapid recovery. From 
1983 through 1989, the U.S. economy experienced its second longest 
and strongest expansion, topped only by the 1960s. Economic growth 
during these years averaged 3.7 percent per year. Unemployment fell 
from over 10 percent in December 1982 to slightly over 5 percent by 
1989. But the poverty rate, which was over 15 percent at the beginning 
of the expansion of the 1980s fell only modestly. By 1990, after six 
years of economic expansion, it had declined only 2.4 percentage 
points and was still above its level of a decade before.
Now move forward again into the 1990s. A mild recession in 1990- 
1991 was followed by strong aggregate growth in 1992-1993. Not sur 
prisingly, poverty rates rose in 1990-1991. Very surprisingly, poverty 
continued to rise in 1992-1993. The poverty rate, 15.1 percent, was 
very near where it was in 1983 at the end of a sharp steep recession. 
For the first time in modern U.S. economic history, economic expan 
sion was associated with increases in the share of poor persons in the 
population.
This paper is about what happened over these years that caused eco 
nomic growth to decline as an effective antipoverty tool. The first part
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compares the expansions of the 1960s and the 1980s and indicates why 
economic growth had far less effect on the income distribution in the 
1980s than two decades earlier. We will discover that the primary cul 
prit is a change in the demand for less-skilled labor that has driven 
down wages among less-skilled workers. The second section discusses 
some of the reasons for these labor market changes, and the third sec 
tion discusses their political and policy implications.
The Death of "Trickle Down Economics"
It has been an axiom of public policy and political rhetoric that eco 
nomic growth helps the poor. More than one president has claimed that 
"the best thing we can do for the poor is to make the economy grow." 
This strategy, often referred to as "trickle down economics," is 
extremely attractive, because it promises that we can fight poverty 
without substantial costs. Economic growth is expected to make mid 
dle-income Americans better off at the same time as it decreases pov 
erty. This is a win-win solution to poverty, requiring no higher taxes on 
one group in order to redistribute to another. Unfortunately, this solu 
tion has been largely ineffective over the past fifteen years.
Figure 1 shows both the poverty rate and the size of the overall 
economy as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the most 
frequently used measure of overall economic capacity, from 1960 to 
1993. 2 Between 1961 and 1969, the U.S. economy experienced its 
longest economic boom, as can be seen from the steep upward rise in 
GDP. Poverty fell 9 percentage points during that period. Between 
1983 and 1989, the U.S. economy experienced its second-longest 
expansion. Poverty declined only 2.4 percentage points during that 
period, and remained well above its historic low of 11.1 percent in 
1973. This is reinforced in the 1990s, when strong economic growth is 
associated with increases in poverty.
One measure of how surprising these changes are can be seen by 
going back to an economics article published in the mid-1980s by Alan 
Blinder and myself (Blank and Blinder 1986). In that article, we esti 
mated the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the 
overall poverty rate. Using data from 1959 (when official poverty num-
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bers begin) to 1983, we were able to track poverty based on the core 
unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the share of government trans 
fers to the poor, and several other macroeconomic indicators. We can 
use that historical relationship between the macro economy and pov 
erty to predict the poverty rate over the 1980s, based on what actually 
happened in the macro economy. Our evidence would have predicted 
that by 1989 the poverty rate should have been down to 9.3 percent, 
driven by declining unemployment and low inflation. In reality, the 
actual poverty rate was 12.8 percent, much higher. 3














59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93
Year
This exercise provides clear evidence of two things: First, no econo 
mist should be so foolish as to engage in economic predictions. Sec 
ond, the historical relationship between macroeconomic growth and 
changes in poverty has fundamentally deteriorated.
Over the past five years, I have been involved in several research 
projects, exploring these changes in the relationship between economic 
growth and poverty.4 Let me first indicate what the causes of the slug 
gish decline in poverty are not. While the following stories are often 
told, they turn out not to explain what is happening:
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1. The problem is not that we are mismeasuring poverty in the 
1980s and 1990s. Poverty rates are based only on cash income 
and do not consider what we call "in-kind" transfers. In-kind 
transfers include noncash public assistance programs, such as 
food stamps or housing assistance. While it is true that in-kind 
transfers have expanded among the poor, most of this expansion 
occurred in the 1970s, when such programs were increasing rap 
idly. Poverty rates that include in-kind income decline by almost 
exactly the same amount over the expansion of the 1980s as do 
official poverty rates. This is perhaps not surprising since in-kind 
income did not grow in real terms over this time period.
2. The problem is not legislative changes in eligibility and benefits 
in public assistance programs. Some have suggested that the cuts 
Ronald Reagan implemented in the early 1980s offset the effects 
of economic growth. While it is true that welfare payments 
declined in real terms for poor families throughout the 1980s, this 
had little effect on poverty, largely because public assistance does 
little to actually move families above the poverty line. Most pub 
lic assistance payments move recipients closer to the official pov 
erty line, but the benefits are low enough that few families 
actually escape poverty because of public benefit payments. (The 
elderly, to whom we provide much more generous benefits, are an 
exception to this. Government assistance moves a substantial 
number of elderly persons and couples out of poverty. But the 
elderly were largely unaffected by the cuts of the early 1980s.)
3. The problem is not the changing demographic composition of the 
poor. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the composition of the 
poor changed substantially. The share of the elderly declined, as 
did the share of poor married-couple families. An increasing 
share of the poor were single-parent families, typically single 
mothers. As it turns out, however, single-mother families are at 
least as responsive (or nonresponsive) to economic growth as 
other groups. If the composition of the poor had remained con 
stant from the early 1960s through the 1980s, the poverty rate 
would have been just as unresponsive to the macro economy of 
the 1980s.
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So what did happen? Let's start by discussing why economic growth 
would be expected to decrease poverty in the first place. Earnings, the 
most important component in most families' income, are the result of 
labor market effort multiplied by wages. How are these affected by the 
economic cycle?
The primary effect of economic growth on the distribution of 
income occurs through the availability of jobs. When the economy 
expands, employment grows and the demand for workers increases. 
Those who are unemployed, employed part-time, or not working at all, 
are most likely to benefit from employment expansions. And unem 
ployed, part-time, and discouraged workers are disproportionately 
likely to be less-skilled individuals in low-income families. Those who 
are working 40 to 50 hours a week are typically unable to benefit as 
much from employment growth. In March 1993, when overall unem 
ployment was 7 percent, unemployment among high school dropouts 
was 15 percent, among high school graduates it was 8 percent, while 
among college graduates it was just over 3 percent. 5 These unemploy 
ment differentials across skill levels have been relatively constant for 
many years in the U.S. economy.
Thus, when the economy expands, the main reason why those in 
families at the bottom of the income distribution catch up, relative to 
those in the middle, is that they gain more from the employment 
expansion that accompanies an economic boom. This clearly happened 
in the 1960s, when both the probability of working and weeks of work 
among the employed expanded more rapidly among persons in low- 
income families than in higher-income families. But it also happened 
in the 1980s. The evidence indicates that adults in low-income house 
holds took advantage of growing employment opportunities in the 
1980s even more than they did in the earlier decades. Work effort was 
more responsive to changes in the economy in the 1980s than in the 
1960s. If we look only at the growth in work behavior, we would have 
expected poverty to fall faster in the 1980s.
If labor market effort expanded as much in the 1980s as the 1960s, 
the only remaining factor is wages. In the 1960s, real wages expanded 
throughout the income distribution. GDP growth of 1 percent in the 
1960s was correlated with a $2.18 increase in real weekly wages 
among workers in low-wage families. This expansion in wages rein 
forced the growth in employment occurring at the same time, so that
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workers both expanded their hours of work and earned more every 
hour. The result was that poverty plummeted during that decade.
Among the poorest groups in the population in the 1980s, however, 
real wages actually fell with economic growth. Both high school drop- 
outs and high school graduates have experienced a steady decline in 
their earnings starting in about 1979 that has continued through the 
past fifteen years. The result was that the poor worked more during the 
economic expansion of the 1980s, but earned less per hour over time. 
Unlike the 1960s, these two effects offset each other. While poverty did 
decline, the decline was much more modest than expected as falling 
real wages limited the economic gains that increased labor market 
involvement should have produced. Both my own research and the 
research of others suggests that the difference between the responsive- 
ness of poverty and of the income distribution to economic growth 
between the 1960s and the more recent decade is entirely due to these 
wage changes.
What's Happening to Wages?
Table 1 shows wage changes among men and women at different 
skill levels over the past twenty-five years. In order to abstract away 
from questions of changes in work effort, the table shows weekly 
wages (inflation adjusted) among nonelderly men and women who 
worked full time year-round. The decade between 1969 and 1979 was a 
bad decade for all workers. A series of recessions combined with high 
inflation rates left virtually all workers with lower wages in 1979 than 
they had earned ten years earlier. Since 1979, however, there has been 
sharp divergence in the wage changes experienced by more- and less- 
skilled workers. Average weekly wages among men who are high 
school dropouts have fallen by 15.6 percent, while they have risen by 
15.7 percent among men who hold college degrees. The distribution of 
earnings has also widened among women, although this is largely 
because of big increases in earnings among more educated women. 
Women without a high school degree have faced virtually stagnant 
weekly earnings since 1969, while women with college degrees have 
seen their earnings grow by 31 percent. A growing body of literature
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has documented these changed among many groups using a wide vari 
ety of data sources. There are two primary conclusions that emerge 
from this literature.6
Table 1. Average Weekly Earnings by Years of School and Sex Among 
Nonelderly Adults Who Work Full Time and Full Year
Education level 1969
Less than a high school 
degree $489
Percent change
High school degree 601
Percent change
Post-high school training, 
no college degree 699
Percent change








































SOURCE: Tabulations from the Current Population Surveys, March 1970, 1980, and 1993, based 
on the civilian population ages 18-65 Inflation adjustments are based on the GDP deflator.
First, these wage changes are spread throughout the economy. They 
are occurring among men and women in virtually all industries and 
occupations. Less-skilled men in both manufacturing and nonmanufac- 
turing industries have experienced similar real wage declines. 
Although the trends are strongest among younger workers, they are 
occurring among older workers as well.
Second, as is visible in table 1, there appear to be substantial gender 
differences in these trends. While the least-skilled women have not 
experienced wage increases, neither have they experienced the wage 
decline of their less-skilled brothers. While this has helped close the 
female-to-male wage gap, presumably those who wanted to bring 
men's and women's wages closer together did not want to do it by 
decreasing men's wages. It is also worth noting that wages among less- 
skilled women remain far below those of men. The average male high 
school dropout earned $400/week if he worked full time year-round in
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1993, while the average female high school dropout earned only $2847 
week at full-time work.
What has caused these wage changes? That question is much dis 
cussed among economists, and a growing literature is attempting to 
explain various causal forces. In general, most analysts agree that it is 
changes in the demand for more- versus less-skilled labor that is driv 
ing these trends. In other words, employer demand for less-skilled 
labor has been falling over the last fifteen years, and this is driving 
down wages among this group. Two particular economy-wide changes 
have been strongly linked to these wage changes: the growing impor 
tance of international competition to U.S. firms and changing technol 
ogy. Let's look at each of these in turn.
The Growing Inte nationalization of the U.S. Economy
As the U.S. economy is increasingly linked with the world econ 
omy, U.S. workers are in competition with workers around the globe. 
In this global labor market, skilled workers in the United States have a 
comparative advantage. The United States has more skilled, college- 
educated workers than any other country in the world. Less-skilled 
U.S. workers, however, are presumably at a comparative disadvantage 
relative to less-skilled workers in industrializing countries, such as 
those in the Pacific rim countries. Because the cost of living and the 
wage levels of less-skilled workers are substantially higher in the 
United States than elsewhere, demand for U.S. less-skilled labor might 
be expected to decrease while demand for less-skilled labor in lower- 
wage countries would rise. 7
The evidence indicates that growth in international economic com 
petition is not adequate by itself to fully explain U.S. wage changes. 
Those industries that have been experiencing rapid growth in interna 
tional competition have not necessarily experienced greater declines in 
wages among less-skilled workers. But there is evidence that this trend 
is at least one of the causal reasons behind these shifts.
Changing Technology in the U.S. Economy
The other story for which there is substantial evidence is the possi 
bility of technology shifts that have been demand-increasing for more
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skilled workers and demand-decreasing for less-skilled workers. 8 The 
rapid spread of computer-based technology in all industries and occu 
pations is often mentioned as an example. In manufacturing industries, 
"smart" machines mean that these companies hire more computer pro 
grammers and computer-literate production line overseers and fewer 
workers to perform repetitive labor. In the service industries, the rapid 
spread of personal computers has decreased clerical demand and 
replaced many persons in less-skilled filing and data entry positions.
There is evidence to support both of these explanations for the wage 
changes of the past fifteen years, and almost surely both of them are 
happening at once. These changes are also linked to a variety of other 
institutional changes that are correlated with declining wages among 
the less skilled. For instance, union jobs continue to disappear in the 
United States, in part because of the economic pressures of changing 
trade and technology. Since unions typically raise the wages of the 
least skilled, this accounts for about one-fifth of the decline in wages 
among less-skilled workers. 9
The most discouraging aspect of these two explanations is that nei 
ther of them promise any reversal of these wage trends. If anything, 
virtually all economists who have looked at these issues predict that the 
current trends toward a more internationalized economy and increasing 
use of "smart" technology, will continue in the near future. This means 
further declines in the earning ability of less-skilled workers.
Policy Implications
There are two major policy implications that emerge from the above 
discussion, both of them posing serious challenges to those who want 
to run effective policies to combat poverty in the United States.
Implication 1: Economic growth is unlikely to be an effective 
antipoverty tool in the near future.
For the past fifteen years, the employment expansions that occur 
when the economy grows have been offset by declines in real wages 
among less-skilled workers. As a result, the antipoverty "kick" that 
economic growth provided in earlier decades has not been available. To
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the extent that these wage trends are likely to continue, it is unreason 
able to expect economic expansions during the 1990s to have substan 
tial antipoverty effects.
Economic growth has historically been the most attractive antipov 
erty tool available. It provided broad-based income redistribution to 
low-income families at a time when the overall economic pie is grow 
ing. Thus, it required few hard political choices. In particular, it did not 
require higher taxes on middle- and upper-income families in order to 
provide services to lower-income families. There were also no admin 
istrative or overhead costs associated with a decline in poverty spurred 
by economic growth, since no government-run programs were 
required.
If economic growth is no longer available, this leaves us with two 
markedly less politically attractive alternatives. The first alternative is 
to pursue broad-based income redistribution through national cash- 
transfer programs for low-income families. This was originally pro 
posed by Richard Nixon, who wanted to replace many small antipov 
erty programs with a nationally based (albeit relatively low) cash 
guarantee for the poorest families. While his plan was enacted for eld 
erly families and resulted in the Supplemental Security Income pro 
gram which provides substantial cash redistribution to elderly and 
disabled persons, it was politically unpalatable for other poor families. 
If anything, since Nixon's time, cash income redistribution has become 
even less politically viable in the United States. In the current environ 
ment, the push has been to decrease cash transfers to the nonelderly 
even further.
The second alternative is to give up on broad-based redistributional 
programs and instead work to design targeted programs that provide 
specific services to clearly defined groups of persons. This would 
include such programs as Headstart, food stamps, housing assistance, 
or employment and training efforts. These programs often link specific 
behavioral requirements to benefits. For instance, parents as well as 
children are required to actively participate in Headstart activities, 
while employment and training programs typically impose attendance 
or effort requirements on participants.
The welfare reform conversations over the last decade have been 
focused on how to effectively implement this second alternative. 
Extensive discussion at the federal and state level has focused on such
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issues as which groups to target, which behavioral requirements to 
impose, and how to efficiently provide these services to the targeted 
recipients.
In contrast to economic growth, such antipoverty efforts require 
extensive governmental planning and management. An organizational 
structure must be established to run programs and verify eligibility. In 
addition, such services clearly cost money up front. The administrative 
costs of implementing and managing these programs are often substan 
tial and usually cost more than broad-based cash redistribution efforts.
Much of the frustration with our antipoverty system has been a frus 
tration with such targeted, heavily managed services. Major discussion 
is occurring about how to streamline these programs to make them 
more efficient and to ensure that they treat more participants more 
effectively. Such discussion was perhaps inevitable in a world where 
targeted service-provision programs provide the major effort against 
poverty. Clearly, the ineffectiveness of overall economic growth as an 
antipoverty tool has left us with much less politically palatable alterna 
tives.
Implication 2: Jobs alone will not solve poverty.
The other implication of the recent labor market changes is that 
employment is a less-effective way to escape poverty. Compared to 
thirty years ago, moving people out of poverty by moving them into 
employment is much harder. This is true for two reasons.
First, the changes in wages among less-skilled workers means that 
jobs pay less. Full-time work at the minimum wage provides only 
$8500, while the poverty line for a family of three is $12,500. Thus, 
efforts to move low-income adults out of poverty via employment will 
require more than just finding a job. Increases in employment will 
increase earnings, but for many low-income workers, this will not 
move them above the poverty line. Hence, in addition to programs 
designed to move people into jobs, we also have programs that supple 
ment earnings by collecting child support from absent fathers, by sub 
sidizing child care, or by supplementing wages through the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. Clearly, this costs more.
Second, as a growing share of the poor are single parents, this also 
limits the effectiveness of employment-based strategies, even in the 
absence of wage deterioration. Single parents often face more time
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constraints. They must act as the sole parent for their children as well 
as the primary family earner, making it harder for them to locate and 
keep a full-time job. In addition, many single parents must earn enough 
not just to cover their living expenses, but also to cover child care 
expenses. This increases the level of wages they need to make employ 
ment an effective strategy for escaping poverty. 10
The United States has long focused on economic self-sufficiency as 
the preferred way out of poverty, at least among families headed by 
nonelderly adults. Our reluctance to provide cash assistance mirrors 
our insistence that the best way to help the poor is to assist them into 
employment in the mainstream economy. Unfortunately, when the jobs 
available to less-skilled adults pay less and less over time, the 
"employment strategy" becomes a harder one to implement as a way to 
assist families out of poverty.
The decline in real wages among less-skilled workers over the past 
fifteen years has seriously limited our ability to address poverty 
through government action. On the one hand, these changes have 
meant that we can no longer rely on economic expansions to do some 
of our work for us, decreasing poverty without explicit policies or pro 
grams on the part of the government. On the other hand, these changes 
have made it harder for us to operate targeted programs aimed at 
increasing employment and earnings among the poor. Given this, it is 
perhaps not surprising that there is a sense of frustration about U.S. 
antipoverty efforts. Let's be clear where the source of the problem lies, 
however. What have changed most significantly in the last fifteen years 
have been the economy and the labor market for poor workers. This 
makes the task harder for all who would design public programs to 
combat poverty. Not impossible, but harder.
NOTES
1. The poverty rate is the share of persons in the population who live in households whose 
cash income falls below the official U.S poverty line. Poverty lines vary with household size.
2. Figure 1 puts GDP in 1993 dollars, which is to say that it is inflation-adjusted and expressed 
in terms of 1993 purchasing power
3 These estimates are report in Blank (1993).
4. The following discussion is based on the evidence in Blank (1993) and Blank and Card 
(1993). Supporting evidence is also presented in Cutler and Katz (1991).
5. Data tabulated from the Current Population Survey tape, March 1993.
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6. For a fuller discussion of these wage trends, see Levy and Murnane (1992), Danziger and 
Gottschalk (1993), or Juhn et al (1993). For a discussion of the broader set of labor market 
changes that have affected less-skilled workers, see Blank (1995)
7 For evidence on the impact of trade competition on wage differentials, see Katz and Mur 
phy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1993), and Sachs and Shatz (1994)
8 For evidence on the impact of changing technology on wages, see Bound and Johnson 
(1992), Davis and Haitiwanger (1991), or Berman, Bound, and Gnhches (1993)
9. See Freeman (1993) or Card (1992).
10 For a further discussion of the implications of these changes on employment-based strate 
gies, see Blank (1994)
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